How Mercedes tried to replicate Ferrari's exhaust wing advantage in Madrid

Ferrari's FTM exhaust wing has been one of the most distinctive technical ideas of Formula 1's new regulatory era, and at the Spanish Grand Prix Mercedes became the latest rival to explore how some of its aerodynamic benefits could be reproduced.
The W17 appeared in Madrid with a new arrangement around the exhaust and rear-wing support pillars, designed to use the exhaust plume to generate additional rear load.

It did not last long.
Mercedes ran the solution during FP1 before removing it as the weekend progressed, returning to a configuration much closer to the specification used at Monza.

The experiment revealed something important about Ferrari's original concept: the real advantage does not come from the winglet alone. It comes from designing the entire rear of the car around it.

Why Ferrari's FTM is so difficult to copy
Ferrari introduced its so-called Flick Tail Mode, or FTM, during pre-season testing in Bahrain.
As we explained in our original technical analysis of Ferrari's exhaust-wing concept, the device sits directly in the exhaust flow and uses the high-energy gases leaving the power unit to influence the aerodynamics at the rear of the SF-26.
The aim is to extract more performance from an area that has become increasingly important under the 2026 regulations.
Ferrari can position the device particularly effectively because of a fundamental packaging decision made when the SF-26 was designed.

The differential sits unusually far towards the rear of the car, made possible by Ferrari's compact gearbox architecture and suspension layout. That matters because the technical regulations define how far certain bodywork can extend relative to the differential.
By moving that reference point rearwards, Ferrari created a few valuable extra centimetres of legal aerodynamic space behind the diffuser.
That allows the FTM element to sit in a position and at an angle that rival teams cannot simply reproduce without reconsidering major mechanical components.

Ferrari is effectively extending the rear aerodynamic system
The exhaust wing should not be viewed as an isolated flap producing downforce by itself.
Its position allows Ferrari to use the exhaust plume to influence airflow leaving the diffuser and travelling towards the underside of the rear wing.
That can improve the interaction between those aerodynamic structures and effectively make the rear of the car work as a more integrated system.
The concept comes with a cost.

Placing aerodynamic structures directly in the exhaust flow can increase restriction and back pressure. Ferrari has therefore accepted a degree of power-unit penalty in exchange for additional aerodynamic performance.
The calculation is simple in principle: is the lap time gained through extra rear load greater than the lap time lost through reduced power and additional resistance?
For Ferrari, on many circuits, the answer has been yes.
The Scuderia has nevertheless experimented with removing the device at tracks where straight-line efficiency carries greater importance. We previously examined that trade-off when Ferrari considered sacrificing the FTM system to improve straight-line performance.
Mercedes found another route
Mercedes cannot simply reproduce Ferrari's architecture.
Its differential and gearbox packaging leave less usable space behind the diffuser, so the Brackley team needed a different interpretation of the same broad aerodynamic idea.
At MADRING, Mercedes extended the two rear-wing support pillars and incorporated additional profiles around the exhaust outlet.

Rather than placing a Ferrari-style element independently in free air, the aerodynamic surfaces were physically connected to the rear-wing supports.
This distinction is important from a regulatory perspective.
Mercedes could treat the pillars, winglets and associated exhaust structure as one legal assembly, allowing it to place aerodynamic surfaces in a region where a standalone Ferrari-style flap would not have been possible with the W17's existing mechanical layout.
The result was visually different, but the intention was familiar: use exhaust energy to increase the effectiveness of the rear aerodynamic package.
Why Mercedes abandoned it so quickly
The device did produce additional load.
The problem was whether that load was worth the compromise required to generate it.

Mercedes arrived in Madrid expecting grip levels on the brand-new asphalt to be relatively low. Extra rear downforce therefore looked potentially valuable, particularly for limiting sliding and controlling rear tyre temperatures.
Reality turned out differently.
The MADRING surface provided considerably more grip than simulations had suggested, reducing the need to chase additional aerodynamic load through such an expensive trade-off.
Mercedes therefore removed the arrangement after its early evaluation.
There is also an important power-unit consideration.
Any solution that partially obstructs or manipulates the exhaust outlet can increase exhaust back pressure. On a turbocharged Formula 1 power unit, that can reduce the pressure differential available across the turbine.
The turbo can compensate to an extent, but doing so requires additional work and can affect efficiency and response.
In other words, Mercedes was trading power-unit performance for aerodynamic load.
Without Ferrari's more advantageous rear-end geometry, the aerodynamic return appears to have been insufficient to justify that compromise.

Why Ferrari can make the trade-off work
This is the crucial difference.
Ferrari did not design an exhaust wing and then find somewhere to attach it.
The SF-26's rear architecture created the opportunity first.
The location of the differential, gearbox casing and surrounding mechanical components allowed Ferrari to place the FTM where it can work together with the diffuser and rear wing.
Mercedes' Madrid experiment was necessarily more limited.
Its winglets could exploit the exhaust plume and produce measurable downforce, but they could not reproduce the complete aerodynamic relationship created by Ferrari's packaging.
That is why copying visible Formula 1 components can be misleading.
Two cars may feature devices that appear to pursue the same concept, but the performance of those devices can depend on structures buried much deeper inside the car.

Ferrari's innovation has already changed the grid
Ferrari's FTM initially looked like one of the more difficult 2026 innovations for rivals to reproduce, but teams quickly found alternative interpretations.
Mercedes, McLaren, Red Bull and others have experimented with exhaust-support structures and winglets that pursue similar objectives without copying Ferrari's mechanical architecture.
The development race became significant enough that the FIA has already moved to close this avenue for next season.
As detailed in our report on the FIA's decision to ban exhaust-wing solutions from 2027, the current concepts remain legal in 2026, but tighter regulations will prevent teams from continuing down the same path next year.
That gives teams only a handful of races to decide whether further development is worthwhile.
Could Mercedes try it again in Baku?
Baku will provide an interesting test of that decision.
Madrid sits at roughly 650 metres above sea level, where reduced air density affects both aerodynamic performance and power-unit behaviour. Baku, by contrast, is essentially at sea level.

That could alter the compromise between exhaust restriction and aerodynamic gain.
But Baku also features the longest full-throttle section on the calendar, making power and efficiency exceptionally valuable. As we explained in our analysis of the 2026 Baku power-unit deployment challenge, teams are already expecting energy management to become one of the defining technical issues of the weekend.
Sacrificing power for additional rear downforce may therefore be difficult to justify.
Whether Mercedes brings the Madrid concept back will reveal plenty about how highly its engineers rate the underlying idea.
Ferrari has spent the entire season proving that exhaust aerodynamics can still offer meaningful performance under the 2026 regulations.
Mercedes' Madrid experiment showed that understanding the idea is relatively easy. Reproducing the complete advantage is much harder.
